When you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be true. – Sherlock Holmes (Arthur Conan Doyle, The Sign of the Four)
What must the cause of the universe be like? According to William Lane Craig, it must be spaceless, timeless, and personal. In effect, it must be a non-physical, non-temporal mind with causal efficacy and unimaginable power. Notice the word, “must.” Craig isn’t just saying he thinks it’s probable – he thinks it can be shown necessarily through argument. This point generally comes as an adjoinder to the Kalam Cosmological Argument, which Craig explains here.
But does this make sense? This is the question I’ve been debating in the comment thread of On Absurdity: William Lane Craig and Actual Infinites. How can we realistically assert some kind of mind as the cause of the universe?
The argument goes essentially as follows:
As the cause of space and time, this cause must be outside of space and time. If the cause is non-spatial and non-temporal, it must be changeless and immaterial. Now, Craig argues, the only entities which can be timeless or immaterial are either minds or abstract objects. However, abstract objects do not possess causal efficacy. Therefore, it must have been a mind. Next, only a free agent can account for the origin of a temporal effect from a timeless cause. So, it must be personal. So, there you have it – the cause of the universe must have been an immaterial mind.
We arrive at this position from a dilemma. This allows Craig and his defenders to invoke what I’m calling the Sherlock Holmes defense. They boil it down to two options and dismiss one of the options as intuitively absurd. So, however much you may be suspicious of the immaterial mind, it’s all that is left. It must have been a mind no matter how improbable you find that conclusion to be! Let’s consider this dilemma further. Either we have a false dilemma, which we can dismiss, or we have a true dilemma, which I will argue still provides no grounds for a conclusion.
What if it is a false dilemma?
In my opinion, the likely conclusion here is that we have arrived at a false dilemma. There are several suspect assumptions that bring us to Craig’s conclusion.
First, we have to decide whether we consider our own universe to be “all of space and time” or whether it is just a universe within some form of external space and time. Craig, to his credit, does attempt to engage in modern science and cosmology to provide support for his premises. He invokes the Big Bang as evidence that all of space and time began at a single point and moment in the finite past. Very few scientists question the Big Bang, though it is far from certain that this is all that exists. For example, M-Theory provides a look into what possibly existed prior to the Big Bang. Proponents of M-Theory might assert that we are a bubble in a sea of universes. This would provide a natural solution to the problem that remains within space and time.
But Craig could then move back and question the cause of all of those universes. He would assert we still have to have a beginning since there could not be an actual infinite. This argument depends on a series of paradoxes – the kind that philosophers love and most people on the street say, “Who cares?” Craig is best known for invoking Hilbert’s Paradox of the Grand Hotel, although, there are a few others he uses. The idea is that actual infinites lead to absurdities, which we can deal with in math, but they simply could not exist in reality. It raises several questions, including, “If the past was an actually infinite series of events, then how would we ever arrive at this moment?” It’s certainly an interesting question, but it is far from decisive in showing this could not have been the case. For example, see a few of Wes Morriston’s responses on actual infinites here and here. These are simply provided to show that the impossibility of actual infinites is questioned among philosophers.
Additionally, Craig’s arguments depend on a certain theory of time. Craig defends an A-Theory of time, but the argument falls apart under a B-Theory. If you don’t know those terms, don’t worry; you’re in good company. This article by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy will get you started with an overview of the issues. B-Theory strikes people as a bit odd – it’s not intuitive – but many feel that special relativity leads us to this view of time. If time is like space, then it is tenseless. It can be measured in relation to other points, but there is no true cardinality.
So, if we could have a beginningless past containing a series of physical, temporal causes, then the problem is gone. The dilemma is not needed, and we can dismiss the notion of an abstract immaterial mind as the creator of everything. This is the route I would take, and I’ve provided some routes to explore in your discussions which I think are fruitful. But let’s delve deeper and consider what would happen if we could not successfully argue any of these points.
What if it is a true dilemma?
What if we really do arrive at the decision to make with either a mind or abstract objects, like numbers, acting in a causal role?
I think we are only justified in reaching a standoff with these options. There is no evidence that either thing acts in a causal role. In fact, the very existence of both things is questionable.
But the point of the Sherlock Holmes defense is that it doesn’t matter whether you think a causal, non-spatial, non-temporal mind cannot exist. What matters is that we have a dilemma and we have eliminated one option from consideration since it is impossible. It must be the other option.
In my discussion mentioned earlier, I suggested that minds do not exist apart from brains. I was challenged to show why this was impossible. In the world of logical possibility, this is pretty difficult. That is essentially the point of Russell’s Teapot and the Flying Spaghetti Monster. Now, let’s turn the tables a bit. If I am challenged to show that minds cannot cause, then it certainly seems fair to challenge Craig and his defenders to show that numbers cannot cause.
The only real defense I’ve heard of this is that “of course numbers don’t cause anything!” A lot of people probably find this persuasive, but we need an argument that cannot be also leveled at minds. I could say, “of course minds only exist when there are brains!” Even with Artificial Intelligence, there would be some physical “stuff” grounding the mind.
So, this is the challenge for the Craig defenders: Provide an argument against numbers that does not apply to immaterial minds. Without such an argument, this dilemma goes nowhere.
To simply assert this dilemma begs the question by assuming minds can play a causal role. We must have some reason to think this. The reason given by defenders is the initial argument I described. Notice this is not empirical evidence; rather, it is a rationalist approach to deduce it purely by logic.
To combat this, I have provided some ways of attacking the premises of the argument to show we never even reach this dilemma and are justified in concluding we have no reason to think minds can cause (or even exist) without brains, at least not in virtue of this argument. If we do not have to reach the dilemma, then the argument does not concern us. This seems like a very reasonable conclusion to me. If we do reach the dilemma, then we are in the very odd stalemate of wondering whether a mind or some abstract object, like pi, caused all of space and time. But, as I’ve said, we really have no reason to prefer one over the other. Intuition about such matters is irrelevant.
Now, there is nothing inherently wrong with the Sherlock Holmes defense. It’s perfectly valid. However, how often do we find ourselves in a position to eliminate all possibilities save one? This type of argument must have such limited scope. We live in a world of uncertainty, of induction, of inference – to deal with such things requires tools equipped to handle uncertainty. This is precisely why Bayes Theorem has been so successful in gaining support. About such ideas as timeless, spaceless, infinity, and origins of everything, I find it very hard indeed to seriously entertain an argument about certainty. I will be suspicious every time of claims that such things can realistically be deduced. The defender may think he or she has made a Sherlock Holmes breakthrough, but what is the messy trail of assumptions, fraught with uncertainty, that led to that final point?
- False Dilemmas
- The Clueless Argument for God’s Existence
- The Lazy Person’s Guide to Dismantling the Moral Argument